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Abstract.  Wireless sensor networks increasingly become viable solutions to 
many challenging problems and will successively be deployed in many areas in 
the future. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is vulnerable to security attacks 
due to the insecure communication channels, limited computational and 
communication capabilities and unattended nature of sensor node devices, 
limited energy resources and memory. Security and survivability of these 
systems are receiving increasing attention, particularly critical infrastructure 
protection. So we need to design a framework that provide both security and 
survivability for WSNs. To meet this goals, we propose a framework for secure 
and survivable WSNs and we present a key management scheme as a case study 
to prevent the sensor networks being compromised by an adversary. This paper 
also considers survivability strategies for the sensor network against a variety of 
threats that can lead to the failure of the base station, which represents a central 
point of failure.  
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A wireless sensor network typically consists of a number of small autonomous sensing devices, 
each of which is called a sensor node with a power unit, a sensing unit, a processing unit, a 
storage unit and a wireless transmitter/receiver. Applications of WSNs are numerous and 
growing, and range from indoor deployment scenarios in the home and office to outdoor 
deployment scenarios in natural, military and embedded settings. The sensor nodes can be 
deployed in controlled environment such as factories, homes, or hospitals; they can also be 
deployed in uncontrolled environment such as a disaster or hostile area, and dangerous 
environment such as battlefields, toxic regions etc [1]. 
 
Wireless sensor network are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of 
transmission and the limited computation and communication capabilities of the sensor node 
[8]. Moreover the majority of the WSN applications should be run continuously and reliably 
without interruptions. Hence, survivability implies that networks should have the capability to 
operate under node failures and attacks. On the other hand, security encompasses the aspects of 
confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of the application information. Obviously, security 
and survivability in WSNs face many common challenges, ranging from the wireless nature of 
communications, resource limitations on sensor nodes, very large and dense networks, and 
unknown network topology prior to deployment, to high risk of physical attacks to unattended The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




sensors [6]. To meet this goals, we focus on not only the security mechanisms but also the 
survivable mechanisms of wireless sensor networks.  
 
The survivability of sensor networks can be achieved by several ways. The security 
mechanisms in sensor networks such as encryption algorithms, key management, and 
authentication are most important of defense. There is an interaction between security and 
survivability. So, we need to study the coupling between security and survivability, and a need 
to create design strategies consist with both sets of requirements for WSN. 
 
To provide secure communications for the WSNs, all the messages should be encrypted and 
authenticated. Consequently, it is important to design strong and efficient key distribution 
mechanisms for WSNs. Clearly, using a single shared key in the whole WSN is not a good idea 
because an adversary can easily obtain the key . Therefore, as a fundamental security service, 
pair-wise key establishment shall be used, which can enable the sensor nodes to communicate 
securely with each other using cryptographic techniques. 
 
However, due to resource constraints on sensor nodes, it is not feasible for sensors to use 
traditional pair-wise key establishment techniques such as public key cryptography and key 
distribution center. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study on security and 
survivability for WSNs. Our goals is to develop a framework, secure and survivable WSNs, 
that provides security and survivability measures that are available for critical services in spite 
of physical and network based security attacks, accidents, or failures. We first study the 
requirements of both security and survivability.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related work on 
WSNs security and survivability. Section 3 describes Sensor Network Architecture and 
Environment. Section 4 discusses the security and survivability requirements for the sensor 
networks. Section 5 presents a proposed framework and also describes secure key management 
scheme as a case study.  Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
There are a lot of survey on security for wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we introduce 
some relevant survey papers here. For securing a wireless sensor network, Mayank [2]   
introduced sensor networks, its related security problems, threats, risks and characteristics, and 
a brief introduction to SPINS, TinySec and LEAP. Mona et al. [3] discussed a concise survey 
on sensor network constraints, security requirements, attacks and defensive measures. They 
described that security requirements are critical to preventing an adversary from compromising 
the security of a distributed wireless sensor networks and the key establishment protocols and 
approaches for distributed wireless sensor networks must satisfy several security and 
functional requirements. Moreover, they also revealed that for security, there are many 
defensive measures for protecting the sensor networks from attacks: key establishment in 
WSNs, defending against DOS attacks, secure broadcasting and multicasting, defending 
against attacks on routing protocols, combating traffic analysis attacks, defending against 
attacks on sensor privacy, intrusion detection, secure data aggregation, defending against 
physical attacks, and trust management.  
 
The authors [4] presented a security framework for wireless sensor network which is composed 
of three phases: cluster formation, secure key management scheme and secure routing. Zia et 
al. [5] presented a secure triple-key management scheme which provides stronger resilience 
against susceptible attacks on sensor networks by keeping in mind the resource starved nature 
of sensor nodes. They only focus on security of WSNs. The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




An optimal key management model to provide security and survivability for heterogeneous 
wireless sensor networks is presented in [7]. This key management scheme can balance the 
cost of the sensor network and maximize the resilience of the sensor network with the required 
security key connectivity constraint in different hostile environment, with a small percentage 
of the powerful sensor nodes. Qin et al. [6] presented the design issues for secure and 
survivable wireless sensor networks, which are vulnerable to physical and network security 
attacks accidents, and failures. They observed that a good design can improve both security 
and survivability of hetegenerous wireless sensor network. But there is a little study on the 
coupling between security and survivability for wireless sensor networks.    
 
3. Sensor Network Architecture and Environment 
 
In this section we introduce the sensor network characteristics on which our security and 
survivability architecture is based. Three groups of aspects have a direct impact on the design 
of our architecture: the sensor nodes characteristics, the network characteristics, and the 
environment.  
 
3.1. Sensor Nodes 
 
Sensor node typically consists of the five components: sensing unit, analog-to-digital convector 
(ADC), central processing unit (CPU), power unit, and communication unit. They are assigned 
with different tasks. The sensor unit is responsible for collecting information as the ADC 
requests, and returning the analog data it sensed. ADC is a translator that tells the CPU what 
the sensor unit has sensed, and also informs the sensor unit what to do. Communication unit is 
tasked to receive command or query from, and transmit the data from CPU to the outside 
world. CPU is the most complex unit. It interprets the command or query to ADC, monitors 
and controls power if necessary, processes received data, computes the next hop to the sink, 
etc. Many other units may be added for special usage, but the above five units are the most 
important ones and are included in every sensor node.  
 
The sensor nodes are characterized as severely resource-constraint devices in terms of 
available energy, memory, and computational power. Different types of sensors such as 
seismic, magnetic, thermal, visual, infrared, acoustic and radar are used to monitor a wide 
variety of ambient condition viz. temperature, pressure, humidity, vehicular movement, and 
noise level. The sensor nodes are not tamper-proof, due to cost factors and the general 
difficulty in building such devices. Consequently, it is possible to physically manipulate the 
devices if captured.  For interaction purposes, the nodes are equipped with radio frequency 
communication capabilities. However, this wireless communication provides only limited 
bandwidth. These sensor node-specific factors set several constraints for the security 
architecture. Due to the limited bandwidth and communication being the most expensive 
operation in terms of energy, messages should not be extended significantly in length when 
apply security and survivability services. 
 
3.2. Sensor Network 
 
WSNs are autonomous system consisting of tiny sensors that are equipped with integrated 
sensing, general purpose computing and limited range or transmitting capabilities. A notable 
feature of the architecture of a WSN is its hierarchy, rooted in a base station.  In most of the 
applications sensors are required to detect events and then communicate the collected 
information to a distant base station (BS). In the hierarchical network architecture, WSN is 
divided into several clusters. In each cluster, one special node acts as cluster head (CH) which The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




collects and compresses the data sent by common sensor nodes within that cluster, and then 
transmits the processed data to BS.  
 
The main functions of cluster-heads include sensing, collecting data from the common sensor 
nodes, aggregating the raw data and transferring the processed data to the BS. A cluster based 
WSN is shown in figure 1. Another important point in sensor networks is the limited lifetime 
of sensor data. Sensor data and accordingly events that are derived from it should be 
communicated in real-time. The network characteristics, similar to the node characteristics, 
determine important aspects of the desired security and survivability architecture.  
 
 
Figure 1. Cluster-based WSN Architecture 
 
3.3. Sensor Environment 
 
The environment of these sensor networks depends on the assigned task. In WSNs, the sensor 
nodes can be deployed in controlled environment such as factories, homes, or hospitals; they 
can also be deployed in uncontrolled environment such as disaster or hostile area, in particular 
battlefield, where monitoring and surveillance is crucial. Clearly, security and survivability in 
WSNs are extremely important for both controlled environment and uncontrolled and hostile 
environment.  
 
4. The Architecture for Secure and Survivable WSN 
  
In this section we describe the security and survivability properties required by sensor network 
and every sensor application should here in order to guarantee appropriate level of security. 
Survivability can be defined as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely 
manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. Security can be defined as the 
combination of availability, confidentiality, and integrity and focuses on “recognition of 
attacks” and “resistance of attacks”. 
 
4.1 Security Requirements for WSN 
 
The security requirements that constitute fundamental objectives based on which every sensor 
application should adhere in order to guarantee an appropriate level of security. 
 
Confidentiality: Confidentiality requirement is needed to ensure that sensitive information is 
well protected and not revealed to unauthorized third parties. The confidentiality objective is 
required in sensors’ environment to protect information traveling between the sensor nodes of 
the network or between the sensors and the base station from disclosure, since an adversary 
having the appropriate equipment may eavesdrop on the communication. 
 The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




Authentication: As in conventional systems, authentication techniques verify the identity of 
the participants in a communication, distinguishing in this way legitimate users from intruders. 
In the case of sensor networks, it is essential for each sensor node and base station to have the 
ability to verify that the data received was really send by a trusted sender and not by an 
adversary that tricked legitimate nodes into accepting false data. 
 
Integrity: Moving on to the integrity objective, there is the danger that information could be 
altered when exchanged over insecure networks. Lack of integrity could result in many 
problems since the consequences of using inaccurate information could be disastrous. Integrity 
controls must be implemented to ensure that information will not be altered in any unexpected 
way. Many sensor applications rely on the integrity of the information to function with 
accurate outcomes. 
 
Freshness: Data freshness objective ensures that messages are fresh, meaning that they obey in 
a message ordering and have not been reused. One of the many attacks launched against sensor 
networks is the message replay attack where an adversary may capture messages exchanged 
between nodes and replay them later to cause confusion to the network.  
 
Secure Management: Management is required in every system that is constituted from multi 
components and handles sensitive information. In the case of sensor networks, we need secure 
management on base station level; since sensor nodes communication ends up at the base 
station, issues like key distribution to sensor nodes in order to establish encryption and routing 
information need secure management. 
 
Availability: Availability ensures that services and information can be accessed at the time 
that they are required. In sensor networks there are many risks that could result in loss of 
availability such as sensor node capturing and denial of service attacks. Lack of availability 
may affect the operation of many critical real time applications.  
 
The requirement of security not only affects the operation of the sensor network, but also is 
highly important in maintaining the availability of the whole network [10]. The security 
requirements that should be met to better protect WSNs from adversaries.  
 
4.2. Survivability Requirements for WSN 
 
This subsection is focused on survivability requirements related with sensor network operation. 
The majority of the WSN applications should be run continuously and reliable without 
interruptions. Hence, survivability should also be taken into account in developing WSNs [6]. 
In the design of survivable WSNs, survivability implies that networks should have the 
capability to operate under node failures and attacks. 
 
Survivability requirements refer to system capabilities for the delivery of essential services in 
the presence of attacks and intrusions, and recovery of full services [9]. First, survivability 
requires that system requirements be organized into essential services and non-essential 
services, perhaps organized in terms of business criticality. Essential services must be 
maintained even during successful intrusions; non-essential services are to be recovered after 
intrusions have been dealt with. Second survivability itself imposes new types of requirements 
on systems for resistance to, recognition of, and in particular, recovery from intrusions and 
compromises. 
 
Requirements Definition for Survivability Services 
 
Survivability services can be organized into three general categories, namely: resistance, 
recognition, and recovery.  The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




Resistance Service Requirements: Resistance refers to the capability of a system to deter 
attacks. 
Recognition Service Requirements: Recognition refers to the capability to recognize attacks 
or to recognize the probing that may precede attacks.  
 
Recovery Service Requirements: Recovery refers to a system’s ability to restore services 
after an intrusion has occurred and to improve its capability to resist or recognize future 
intrusion attempts.  
 
4.3. The Architecture 
 
Firstly, we present a general WSN security and survivable architecture. Sensor networks 
typically operate in hostile outdoor environments. In such environments, the small form factor 
of the sensors, couple with the unattended and distributed nature of their deployment make 
them highly susceptible to physical attacks, i.e., threats due to physical attacks destroy sensors 
permanently, so the losses are irreversible. For instance, attackers can extract cryptographic 
secrets, tamper with the associated circuitry, modify programming in the sensors, or replace 
them with malicious sensors under the control of the attacker. Thus, WSNs also have the 
general security requirements  of confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and security 
management. 
 
The majority of WSN applications should be run continuously and reliably without 
interruption. Due to resource constraints and uncontrolled environment of WSN these two 
factors are very important. To increase security and survivability, we propose a general   
security framework  for WSN. To provide secure communications for the WSNs, all aspects of 
security requirements and services need to be met and provided. Consequently, it is also 
important to address the reliability issue in the design of secure architecture for WSN using 
modeling and survivable strategies. 
 
In figure 2, we describe the security and survivablity requirements, the prevention and 
protection schemes need to be designed and met the security requirements and provide the 
secure services. The detection and response schemes need to be designed to passively protect 
WSNs, we use various security techniques for WSN. The security and survivability 
requirements and services, combined with the security and survivability mechanisms and 
techniques, form the general security and survivability architecture for WSN. 
 
 
Figure 2. General Architecture for Secure and Survivable WSN 
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5. Proposed Secure and Survivable Framework 
 
In this section, we address our proposed secure and survivable model for WSN in a UML 
(Unified Modeling Language) collaboration diagram, as shown figure 3. This diagram consists 
of nine major components: User, Base Station, Cluster Head, Sensor Node, Registry, Broker, 
Monitor, Key Management and Factory. The concept of the factory is commonly used design 
patterns in the object oriented design. Normal operation steps are depicted by the messages 
from (1.1 to 3.10), and the event of any failures (component, system, sensor node, cluster head 
or network) security breaches, or attacks on the system, the recovery operation starts with 
message 4.1 to 4.4.  Key management steps are depicted by the messages from (2.1 to 2.4). 
 
 
Figure 3. Proposed Model for Secure and Survivable WSN 
 
In order to support secure and survivable services, base station needs additional 
communication channels among the components. The registry provides a conventional naming 
service and the redundant base stations are generated and deployed before the operation starts. 
The base stations register themselves to the registry implying that their service is available. 
The available base stations list is maintained by the monitor component. The monitor checks 
the base stations’ operating status. The broker acts as an entry point to the service. The user 
interface and cluster head will connect to the broker asking for a specific service and base 
station information. The broker keeps a list of active base stations running through the monitor. 
The list is updated with the monitors’ reports. The monitor will respond the base stations status 
information when it receives the broker’s request. The monitors communicate with other 
monitors’ coverage. The monitor performs operations such as gathering the server status 
report, forwarding it to the broker and, most important, analyzing the reason for failure and the 
type of attacks in order to find out possible survivable methods.  
 
In the beginning of the operation, an array of ‘n’ redundant components is initiated. These 
redundant base stations will be used as a buffer while a more robust base station is generated 
and deployed.  When a base station fails because of an attack or internal failures, the buffer 
base stations will take over the service for a brief period until the new survivable base station is 
initialized. Since all of the buffer base stations are susceptible to the same failures or attacks, it 
is a matter of time before the redundant base stations are also infected by the same reason. 
Therefore, if the transition period is long, multiple buffer base station may be used before the The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




survivable base station is ready. The monitor informs the factory about the base station failure 
and requests to build a new survivable base station. 
 
The factory, upon receiving the request from the monitor, starts to build the survivable base 
station. During the building time the factory deploys a buffer base station to serve user and 
cluster head for a temporary period. The factory updates the active base station list to the 
monitor, and the monitor then updates the broker concerning the base station list. In the 
meantime, the broker delegates all service calls to the temporary buffer base station until it is 
notified about the construction of a survivable base station. After building the secure and 
survivable base station, the factory deploys the new base station, and the buffer base station is 
revoked from service. Again, the monitor is informed about the creation of the secure and 
survivable base station, which in turn informs the broker about the deployment of a new base 
station. To make the service more robust, the factory can generate multiple copies of the secure 
and survivable base station for possible use in the future. 
 
Although this approach supports the service availability to the user and cluster head 
continuously, the new base station might still be susceptible to the same failures or attacks. In 
order to connect to the new base station, the user and cluster heads need to stub of the new base 
station. This can hide the location of the base station from the attacker using different binding 
information. Although the attacker figures out the new location of the base station, it cannot 
send any messages to the base station, because the communication port number of the base 
station and even the interfaces has been changed.  
 
5.1. Key Management Scheme 
 
A key management procedure is an essential constituent of network security. Symmetric key 
systems require key to be protected. Insecure environments like those sensor networks will be 
used in make this even more important. Moreover, sensor networks have energy and 
computational constraints. Therefore it is necessary to maintain a balanced security. We 
propose a key management scheme for sensor networks, with the objective of minimizing the 
computation, communications and storage overhead by key management. 
 
In our approach the nodes use a symmetric key mechanism; therefore each node should store 
the keys if shares with it’s the higher levels of the network hierarchy. Since the sensors are 
memory constrained and are susceptible to attacks by the adversary, they should be assigned 
the minimum number of keys. Assigning minimum number of keys  saves memory. In case a 
node is compromised it also helps to reduce the impact of the damage since less number of 
keys would be revealed to the adversary. As soon as the sensor nodes are deployed, all the 
sensor nodes and clusters send their ID to the base station. In our key management scheme 
consists of three keys:  
− Kg (group key) - Generated by base station, pre-deployed to all sensor nodes in the 
entire network. Node uses this key to encrypt the data. 
− Kcl (cluster key) - Generated by base station to all the cluster heads in the entire 
network. Base station and nodes from the cluster head use this key to decrypt the data. 
− Ks (sensor key) - Generated by the base station to all the sensors in the entire network. 
The base station   use this key to encrypt the data to send to the cluster head. 
  In our key management schemes, when base station sends a   message to the cluster 
head, it constructs the message as follows: 
             { Kg, Kcl , MAC , ID , TS , N , Message } 
 
Base station encrypts its own ID and a current time stamp TS. Base station generates a random 
number N and Kcl for cluster header. Cluster head checks the ID from the packet, if the ID in The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  




the packet matches the ID its holds, verifies the authentication and integrity of the packet 
through MAC. Otherwise, packet is dropped by the cluster head. The base station builds the 
message using the fields below: 
          EKs { Kg, Kcl, MAC, ID , TS, N , Message } 
 
Base station encrypt the message and broadcast the data. When the cluster head receives the 
messages, it decrypts it by using Ks. Cluster head aggregates the messages received from its 
nodes and forwards it to the next  level cluster head or if the cluster head is one hop closer to 
sensor node. Receiving cluster head checks its routing table and constructs the following 
packets to be sent to the next level cluster head. The cluster head adds it own ID and rebuild 
the packet as the following: 
              { IDcl, { Kg, Kcl , MAC, IDcl, TS , N , Message } 
 
Here the ID is the ID of the receiving cluster head which wraps the message and sends to the 
next hop cluster head or to the lowest cluster head. Next hop cluster head receives the packet 
and checks its own ID, if the ID in the packet is the same as its holds, it updates the ID for the 
next hop and broadcast it, or else the packet is discarded. Aggregate message refers to the 
message aggregated by the cluster head. Finally, all the cluster head receives Kcl and Kg 
generated by the base station. When cluster head sends the message  to the sensor nodes, it 
constructs the messages as follows: 
{ IDcl, Kg , TS , MAC, N , Message } 
 
Finally, the sensor node gets Kg for use to encrypt the message in order to send to the cluster 
head. In our key management schemes all the key are generated by the base station. Base 
station also verify MAC and data  and also process aggregate data.  Cluster head aggregate 
data coming from the sensor nodes and then send to the base station. In our scheme, we use 
message authentication code (MAC). It is efficient symmetric cryptographic primitive for two 
party authentication. For any message, a secure MAC function prevents on attacker without 
prior knowledge of the secret key from computing the correct MAC. A MAC achieves 
authenticity for point-to-point communications because a receiver knows that a message with 
the correct MAC must have been generated either itself or by the sender. The sequence 
diagram of key management scheme is as shown in figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4. Sequence Diagram of Key Management Scheme 
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Our key management scheme convenient for resource constraints sensor network. Because we 
use symmetric key management scheme, it reduces computational overhead and saving energy 
consumption.  Moreover, our scheme gives robust to packets loss and short authentication 
latency and low communication overhead and only need low storage requirements in memory. 
Identically, the scheme that recovers from any loss of packets, has no authentication latency, 
can individually authenticate packets, has negligible overhead, and has a computation cost 
similar to what is found in symmetric cryptographic primitives.  This key management scheme 
also gives strong encryption and authentication among sensor nodes to protect confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the communications and computation of wireless sensor network. 
This encryption increase the resistance of the WSNs. Resistance refers to the capability of a 




In this paper, we have outlined some important security requirements and survivability 
requirements for WSNs. Based on the study about the security requirements and survivability 
requirements, we have developed architecture and proposed a framework for secure and 
survivable WSNs. Sensor networks are often organized hierarchically, with a base station 
which is responsible for data collection and management of a wireless sensor network (WSN). 
The base station is a single point of failure and if attacked it can bring down the entire wireless 
sensor network. This paper concerns strategies for increasing survivability of WSN against a 
variety of threats that can lead to the failure of the base station. We use key management 
scheme as a case study to better understanding of the interaction between security and 
survivability. As wireless sensor networks continue to grow and become more common, we 
expect that further expectations of security and survivability will be required of these WSN 
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